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Abstract
Medical errors originating in healthcare facilities are a signiﬁcant source of
preventable morbidity, mortality, and healthcare costs. Voluntary error report
systems that collect information on the causes and contributing factors of medi-
cal errors regardless of the resulting harm may be useful for developing eﬀective
harm prevention strategies. Some patient safety experts question the utility
of data from errors that did not lead to harm to the patient, also called near
misses. A near miss (a.k.a. close call) is an unplanned event that did not result
in injury to the patient. Only a fortunate break in the chain of events pre-
vented injury. We use data from a large voluntary reporting system of 836,174
medication errors from 1999 to 2005 to provide evidence that the causes and
contributing factors of errors that result in harm are similar to the causes and
contributing factors of near misses. We develop Bayesian hierarchical models
for estimating the log odds of selecting a given cause (or contributing factor)
of error given harm has occurred and the log odds of selecting the same cause
given that harm did not occur. The posterior distribution of the correlation
between these two vectors of log-odds is used as a measure of the evidence
supporting the use of data from near misses and their causes and contributing
factors to prevent medical errors. In addition, we identify the causes and con-
tributing factors that have the highest or lowest log-odds ratio of harm versus
no harm. These causes and contributing factors should also be a focus in the
design of prevention strategies. This paper provides important evidence on the
utility of data from near misses, which constitute the vast majority of errors in
our data.
KEYWORDS: Bayesian hierarchical models; Correlation; Medical error; Vol-
untary error reports
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1 Introduction
Medical errors originating in healthcare facilities are a signiﬁcant source of preventable
morbidity, mortality, and healthcare costs (Brennan and others 1991, Leape and others
1991). The Institute of Medicine has estimated that 44,000 to 98,000 hospital deaths
each year may be attributed to medical error (Kohn and others 1999). In the past, error
prevention eﬀorts have focused on examining the root causes of errors that resulted
in serious harm, such as the death of the patient (Aspden and others 2003). This
approach ignores all the information related to errors that did not result in harm, but
had the potential to cause serious harm, referred to as near misses. Near misses occur
much more frequently than harmful errors and, therefore, may be useful for informing
prevention strategies, particularly for errors that occur rarely within a single healthcare
facility.
Recently, several anonymous, voluntary reporting systems have been created to
collect detailed information on the causes and contributing factors of medical errors
(Wu and others 2002, Webb and others 1993). These systems combine reports of error
across many healthcare facilities and include reports of both adverse events and near
misses. The largest reporting system is MEDMARX®, a national, Internet-accessible
database of medication error reports, created and maintained by the United States
Pharmacopoeia (USP). An error report submitted to MEDMARX includes a detailed
list of the types of medication errors that have occurred (e.g. Wrong administration
technique, Wrong patient, Wrong time), the causes of the error (e.g. Calculation
error, Communication, Handwriting illegible/unclear) and contributing factors of the
error (e.g. Distractions, Fatigue, Poor lighting). In addition, an error report provides
information on the degree of severity of the harm caused by the error.
Recently, the ﬁeld of healthcare safety has begun adopting ideas developed by other
3
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high-risk industries, including aviation, nuclear power technology, and petrochemical
processing, for developing more eﬀective safety strategies (Hudson 2003). These high
risk industries have relied upon the causal continuum hypothesis (CCH), which states
that the causes and contributing factors of errors that lead to harm are similar to the
causes and contributing factors of errors that do not lead to harm . The CCH implies
that, because near misses occur much more frequently than harmful errors, but are
similar in their causes and contributing factors, data on near misses are useful for
understanding error prevention, recovery from errors, and harm reduction.
In the transportation industry, Wright & Van der Schaaf (2004) studied the causes
of 240 train incidents in the UK that were reported through a combination of manda-
tory and voluntary reporting systems. They ﬁrst estimated pˆc1 and pˆ
c
0, deﬁned as the
probabilities of citing cause c in adverse events (death or serious harm to individuals
or train damage without harm to individuals) and near misses (no damage or injury),
respectively. For each of the 21 possible causes, χ2 tests were used to test for diﬀer-
ences between pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1. The authors argued that because of the lack of evidence for
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between pc0 and p
c
1, the CCH was validated.
We argue that conducting a series of tests of hypotheses of the type H0 : p
c
0 = p
c
1,
one for each cause, to assess the validity of the CCH has limitations. First, lack
of evidence of statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in probabilities does not imply that
the null hypothesis is true. Second, testing pc0 = p
c
1 for each cause c independently
does not provide a global quantitative measure of the evidence and its associated
uncertainty for the validity of the CCH. Third, equality of probabilities (pc0 = p
c
1 for all
c) is not a necessary condition for the CCH. The CCH only requires that the causes and
contributing factors are similar between adverse events and near misses. We interpret
this similarity as saying that the causes that are most often identiﬁed in adverse events
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are also the causes that are most often identiﬁed in near misses.
Since the 1930's, the CCH has been widely accepted in most areas of safety re-
search (Heinrich 1931), despite a lack of evidence for its validity. Because of this lack
of evidence, some experts in healthcare quality have questioned the utility of data on
near misses (Layde and others 2002). Providing a global, quantitative measure of the
evidence and its uncertainty supporting the CCH in healthcare is of primary impor-
tance. In addition, the majority of the statistical analyses of medical error reporting
systems conducted so far have been descriptive with no formal statistical framework
for inference (Hicks and others 2004, Hicks & Becker 2006, Morris & Morris 2000).
Developing a statistical approach for quantifying the evidence for the CCH that can
overcome the limitations identiﬁed above is very important. An appropriate analysis
can inform future collection and analysis of data on medical errors and encourage the
use of data on near misses, which constitute 98% of the data, to prevent harm.
In this paper, we use a voluntary error report database of 836,174 medication
errors to provide evidence toward the causal continuum hypothesis. We develop a
global statistical procedure for assessing the degree of similarity between causes and
contributing factors of harmful errors and causes and contributing factors of near
misses. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the correlation (ρ) between the log odds of re-
porting a speciﬁc cause of error given that harm has occurred and the log odds of
reporting the same cause of error in a near miss. We use a Bayesian hierarchical model
to estimate the posterior distribution of ρ as a measure of the evidence for the CCH.
Under this approach, we can rely upon the correlation as a continuous measure of the
evidence for the CCH and its uncertainty, rather than conducting a large number of
hypothesis tests. Also, the hierarchical model estimates the correlation as a natural
by-product, accounting for varying levels of precision in the log-odds estimates. We
5
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compare our models to the analysis of Wright & Van der Schaaf. We also identify the
causes and contributing factors that are most or least likely to be identiﬁed when the
error resulted in harm than in a near miss.
In Section 2 we describe the large database of medication errors that is used in this
analysis and illustrate some data characteristics. In Section 3 we present the methods
used in this analysis. In Section 4 we present results from the various analyses, and in
Section 5 we discuss the analyses and their impact on medication safety.
2 Data
We analyze data on medication errors collected through MEDMARX, one of the largest
voluntary error report collection systems, containing more than 1.4 million reports
submitted by more than 880 healthcare facilities. Each medication error reported to
MEDMARX is categorized according to the harm score, developed by the National
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP
n.d.). Table 1 summarizes the deﬁnitions of the harm score and the percentage of
the reported errors that fall into each harm category. Not surprisingly, only 0.01% of
reported errors resulted in death (category I) and less than 2% caused some harm to
the patient (categories E,F,G,H,I).
Error reports also include information on the causes of the error (e.g. Documen-
tation, Knowledge deﬁcit, Workﬂow disruption) and contributing factors to the error
(e.g. Distractions, Shift change, Patient transfer). Both the cause and contributing
factor ﬁelds contain a list of choices, deﬁned by USP in consultation with medication
safety experts. More than one cause or contributing factor may be identiﬁed in the
same error report. Tables 2 & 3 list all causes and contributing factors considered in
this study and the observed frequencies of being cited in adverse events and in near
6
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misses, respectively. In general, the data contain much more information on the causes
of error than on the contributing factors of error, as 75.43% of the error reports did
not identify any contributing factors. Throughout this paper, we will use the term
causes to refer to either causes or contributing factors.
We analyze medication errors reported from 1999, the ﬁrst complete year of data
collection, through the end of 2005. During this time period, there were a total of
836,174 reports of error from 677 hospitals, including 16,052 (1.92%) reports involving
some level of harm (Harm categories E-I). Figure 1 displays the number of reports
submitted by the 100 hospitals with the largest total reporting volume separately for
harm and no harm. In both plots the facilities are sorted by the total number of
submitted reports, so that facility j in the left panel corresponds to facility j in the
right panel. Each facility submitted at least one report to be included in the database,
with a maximum of 18,145 reports submitted by a single facility. Note that facilities
that report the largest number of near misses do not necessarily report the largest
number of harmful errors. In addition, there is considerable variability across hospitals
in the proportion of the reported errors that result in harm. This variability may be due
to the diﬀerent methods of error detection utilized, varying levels of emphasis within
facilities on error detection and reporting, and the variety of facility types included in
the database, which may have inherent diﬀerences in the rate of harm among errors.
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of facilities that submit at least n reports of
adverse events and the proportion of facilities that submit at least n reports of near
misses, where n varies from zero up to 25. The curve for adverse events drops
oﬀ quickly as n increases from zero, while the curve for near misses remains above
90% even at n = 25. Approximately 50% of facilities in the database submitted
less than seven reports of harmful error, which equates with less than one harmful
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report per year for facilities enrolled in the program for the entire time period under
consideration. This lack of reporting of adverse events underscores the need to learn
from near-miss data. Adverse events occur rarely compared to near misses, and those
adverse events that do occur may be more likely to be concealed or underreported by
staﬀ members that fear retribution. With so little information available on the errors
that result in patient harm, hospitals may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to draw conclusions and
design interventions to reduce error. Therefore, data from near misses may provide an
important additional source of information for hospitals that want to learn about how
to reduce error and harm.
3 Methods
In this section, we introduce a Bayesian hierarchical model (BHM) to quantify the
strength of the evidence and its uncertainty that the causes and contributing factors
of adverse events are similar to the causes and contributing factors of near misses. Let
Xci be the indicator of reporting cause c on event report i. Let zi be the indicator of
harm on report i (zi = 1 when the error is in harmscore categories E-I and zi = 0 when
the error is in harmscore categories B-D). Our goal is to develop a global procedure for
providing evidence toward the hypothesis that the causes that are most often identiﬁed
in harmful errors are also most often identiﬁed in near misses. To accomplish this
8
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objective, we introduce the following hierarchical model:
Stage I: Xci |zi, βc0, βc1 ∼ Binom
(
exp{βc0 + (βc1 − βc0)zi}
1 + exp{βc0 + (βc1 − βc0)zi}
)
; (3.1)
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, c ∈ {1, . . . , C} independent
Stage II:
 βc0
βc1
 ∼ N2

 µ0
µ1
 ,Σ =
 σ20 σ01
σ01 σ
2
1

 (3.2)
Stage III:
 µ0
µ1
 ∼ N2

 a0
a1
 ,
 A0 0
0 A1

 (3.3)
Σ ∼ IW2 (ω,D)
In this model, β0 = (β
1
0 , . . . , β
C
0 )
′ and β1 = (β11 , . . . , β
C
1 )
′ are vectors of log odds of
citing each cause in reports of near misses and reports of adverse events, respectively.
The parameters µ0 and µ1 are nuisance parameters denoting the average of β
c
0 and
βc1 across causes.
The parameter of interest is ρ = σ01/(σ0σ1), denoting the correlation between β
c
0
and βc1 across c. If ρ = 1, then there is a perfect linear relation between β
c
0 and β
c
1.
In addition, because this relation is positive and monotonic, it would imply that for
all causes, the relative rank of the log odds of identifying a given cause in an adverse
event is identical to the relative rank of the log odds of identifying the same cause
in near misses. Therefore, a large, positive correlation indicates that the causes and
contributing factors most frequently involved in adverse events are among the causes
and contributing factors most frequently involved in near misses. We argue that the
posterior distribution P (ρ|data) can be used as a measure of evidence in favor of the
CCH.
We choose noninformative priors. In particular, in the hyperprior for Σ, we set
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D = I2 and ω = 3. These values yield a marginal prior for ρ that is uniform on [-
1,1] and a suﬃciently noninformative prior for the variances, σ20 and σ
2
1 (Barnard and
others 2000). In the hyperprior for µ, a0 = a1 = logit(1/C), and A0 = A1 = 1000.
These values are intended to provide a prior that is approximately ﬂat over the interval
of reasonable values for µ0 and µ1. All posterior distributions were estimated via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, as described in the Appendix.
Fitting a model using MCMC with many parameters (139) and a very large data
set (836,174 × 67), as in this example, is very computationally intensive. Generating
posterior samples of size 10,000 from the model described above took approximately
7 days. To simplify computation, as a sensitivity analysis, we used the normal approx-
imation of the likelihood function and deﬁned the following hierarchical model:
Stage I:
 βˆc0
βˆc1
 ∼ N2

 βc0
βc1
 , Vˆ c
 (3.4)
Stage II:
 βc0
βc1
 ∼ N2

 µ0
µ1
 ,Σ

where Vˆ c is estimated from the data and assumed known. All other parameters are
the same as in the previous model.
We used Two Level Normal independent sampling estimation (TLNise) to produce
Bayesian posterior samples of model parameters, including ρ (Everson & Morris 2000).
We compared the results from this model ﬁt via TLNise to the previous model ﬁt with
MCMC. The TLNise sampling method speciﬁes a uniform prior on Σ and noninfor-
mative prior on µ. It is much more eﬃcient than MCMC, reducing computation time
to approximately one minute.
The model proposed above allows for estimation of the heterogeneity matrix and
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correlation among the true log odds as a natural by-product of the model. In addition,
under the BHMs proposed here, we can estimate P (ρ|data) accounting for the diﬀering
levels of precision in the log odds estimates. Finally, combining information across
causes yields estimates of βc0 and β
c
1 with lower mean-square error, especially for the
least frequently cited, and thus least precisely estimated, causes. Therefore, in addition
to providing evidence for the CCH, our model provides improved estimates of βc0 and
βc1 for identifying causes most likely to be aberrant with respect to the CCH.
We also compare the hierarchical models introduced here to a series of χ2 tests, as
was used in the study of transportation safety (Wright & Van der Schaaf 2004). That
analysis focused on testing for statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the probability of
citing each cause between events involving injury or damage and near misses. More
speciﬁcally, we applied this approach to our data, using a χ2 test for each cause
c ∈ {1, . . . , C} to test the null hypothesis H0 : pc1 = pc0, where pc1 is the probability of
citing cause c in a report of an adverse event, and pc0 is the probability of citing cause
c in a report of a near miss. In the analysis of causes, C = 67, and in the analysis
of contributing factors, C = 20. A conservative Bonferroni correction was used to
adjust for the multiple tests. Causes with p-values less than .05/C were identiﬁed as
having a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between pc0 and p
c
1.
In addition to providing evidence on the CCH, it is important to identify causes that
have the highest or lowest log odds-ratios of being cited in adverse events compared
to near misses. Bayes rule indicates that this quantity is equal to the log-odds ratio
of harm occurring in errors citing the cause versus errors that did not cite the cause,
as shown by the relation
P (Xci = 1|zi = 1)/P (Xci = 0|zi = 1)
P (Xci = 1|zi = 0)/P (Xci = 0|zi = 0)
=
P (zi = 1|Xi =c 1)/P (zi = 0|Xci = 1)
P (zi = 1|Xci = 0)/P (zi = 0|Xci = 0)
.
11
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Therefore, causes with estimated log-odds ratios that are very high or very low may
be of interest. We deﬁne the standardized log-odds diﬀerence as
θc =
βc1 − βc0 − (µ1 − µ0)√
σ20 + σ
2
1 − 2τ
. (3.5)
A priori, the θc are independent and identically distributed as N(0, 1), and θc = 0
implies that the diﬀerence in log-odds estimates for cause c is equal to their average
across causes, that is, βc1 − βc0 = µ1 − µ0. Therefore, the posterior distribution of θc
can be used to ﬂag causes with a log-odds diﬀerence that deviates from the average
in excess of what would be expected, given the unexplained variability across causes.
A cause or contributing factor is labeled as aberrant if P (|θc| > t|data) > K, where
t is a quantile of the standard normal distribution. We chose to use t = 1.96 and
K = .5 so that we identify causes and contributing factors with a posterior median in
the 2.5% tail area of the prior distribution.
The proposed approach for identifying causes that are aberrant with respect to
the CCH has two main advantages. First, we have found in exploratory analyses that
on average, a larger number of causes are cited simultaneously on reports of errors
resulting in harm than on reports of near misses. By removing the overall diﬀerence
in means (µ1− µ0) we can account for this reporting diﬀerential. Second, by dividing
by the variance of βc1 − βc0 across causes (σ20 + σ21 − 2τ), the standardized log-odds
diﬀerence accounts for the heterogeneity across causes and, therefore, identiﬁes causes
with a diﬀerence in the log-odds of being cited between adverse events and near misses
that is large enough to be considered abnormal compared to other causes.
12
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4 Results
Table 2 summarizes the estimated probabilities, pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1, of reporting each cause
c among near misses and adverse events, respectively. For each cause we give the
p-value from a χ2 test of the null hypothesis H0 : p
c
0 = p
c
1. Causes marked with a
* are those where we reject H0 at a Bonferroni-corrected 0.05 level. In addition, we
report the relative ranks of pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1. Table 3 summarizes the same information for
contributing factors.
Tables 2 and 3 show that, even when using the very conservative Bonferroni
correction, in 34 out of 67 causes and 15 out of 20 contributing factors we reject
H0 : p
c
0 = p
c
1. However, the empirical correlation between pˆ
c
0 and pˆ
c
1 is 0.941 (95%
CI: 0.906, 0.964) for causes and 0.939 (95% CI: 0.85, 0.976) for contributing fac-
tors. Therefore, despite many causes and contributing factors with probabilities of
being cited that are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between adverse events and
near misses, pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1 are highly correlated.
The left panel of Figure 3 displays the maximum likelihood estimates (top) and
Bayesian posterior means (bottom) of the log-odds of citing each cause in a report of
an adverse event plotted against the log-odds of citing the same cause in a report of
a near miss. Causes that were identiﬁed as having the highest or lowest log odds-ratio
of being cited in harm versus no harm by the standardized log-odds diﬀerence are
plotted with a solid symbol. The diameter of the plotting symbols are scaled inversely
according to the maximum variance of the two estimates of log-odds for each point.
The right panel of Figure 3 displays the same information for contributing factors.
Because of the large sample size, the log-odds of reporting a cause or contributing
factor is estimated with high precision. Therefore, there is very little shrinkage in the
Bayesian estimates, except for the least frequently reported causes. Overall, there
13
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appears to be a strong positive linear relation between the two vectors of log-odds
for both causes and contributing factors. This relation is reﬂected in the estimated
posterior mean of ρ from the Bayesian model using MCMC, 0.943 (95% PI: 0.911,
0.966) for causes and 0.922 (95% PI: 0.837, 0.97) for contributing factors.
Figure 4 compares the estimated posterior of ρ from the MCMC sample to that of
the TLNise sample, as well as the empirical estimate of ρ calculated from the log-odds
MLEs. This ﬁgure shows that the posterior distribution of ρ estimated from TLNise
is very similar to the results obtained from the MCMC sample. The posterior mean of
ρ estimated using TLNise is 0.946 (95% PI: 0.911, 0.969) for causes and 0.942 (95%
PI: 0.864, 0.982) for contributing factors.
Figure 5 displays boxplots of the posterior distributions of θc for each cause and
contributing factor. Dashed lines mark the chosen cutoﬀ, t = 1.96. The standardized
log-odds diﬀerence criterion identiﬁes the causes and contributing factors with the
largest Bayesian estimates of the log-odds ratio of being cited in adverse events versus
near misses. More speciﬁcally, we found that cause 47 (pump failure/malfunction)
has an estimated log-odds ratio of harm of 1.461 (95% PI: 1.285, 1.626) and cause
32 (pump, improper use) has an estimated log-odds ratio of harm of 1.555 (95% PI:
1.477, 1.633). These two causes were cited more frequently in reports of adverse
events than in reports of near misses. Cause 17 (computerized prescriber order entry)
has an estimated log-odds ratio of harm of -1.945 (95% PI: -2.223, -1.682); cause
14 (workﬂow disruption) has an estimated log-odds ratio of harm of -1.478 (95%
PI: -1.682, -1.286); and cause 12 (abbreviations) has an estimated log-odds ratio of
harm of -1.305 (95% PI: -1.488, -1.127). These three causes were identiﬁed as being
cited more frequently in reports of near misses than in reports of adverse events. No
contributing factors were identiﬁed using the given threshholds.
14
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Note that the causes identiﬁed in Figure 3 are not those with the smallest p-values
from the tests reported in Tables 2 and 3, so simply reducing the α-level of the χ2
tests would not produce the same results. Interestingly, the causes and contributing
factors identiﬁed by the posterior for θc happen to be those with the largest magnitude
diﬀerences in relative ranks. These causes tend to have log odds of being cited that
are near the center of the distribution in both adverse events and near misses, where
the majority of the causes lie. Because causes are clustered more tightly in this portion
of the distribution, a diﬀerence between pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1 that is only moderately large can
lead to a very large diﬀerence in ranks (rc1 − rc0). For example, cause 17 identiﬁed
above has pˆ170 = 0.00204 and pˆ
17
1 = 0.00027. However, r
17
0 = 17 r
17
1 = 45. This large
diﬀerence in relative ranks would be important to investigators that want to prioritize
causes according to frequency. The standardized log-odds diﬀerence identiﬁes causes
like these because they have at least moderately large diﬀerences in log-odds with
suﬃciently small standard errors that prevent shrinkage toward equality.
5 Discussion
The proliferation of large and complex data sets providing information on the causes
and contributing factors of medical errors has many implications for the future of health
care research, practice, and policy. Careful analyses of these data could yield great
insight into the prevention of error and the reduction of harm due to error. In order to
draw reliable inferences, however, we must carefully consider the use of data from near-
miss reports and its ability to inform investigators about the causes and contributing
factors of errors resulting in patient harm. This analysis contributes substantially to
the ﬁeld of medication safety by providing evidence in support of the use of near-
miss data for learning about the causes and contributing factors of medication errors.
15
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Utilizing near-miss data in future analyses of medication error will increase the ability
of investigators to make inference about the causes and contributing factors of error
and may allow for the identiﬁcation of sources of error within healthcare practice before
they are able to cause signiﬁcant harm.
Evaluating the evidence for the CCH in medication error involves comparing the
presence/absence of the various causes and contributing factors between two samples
of reports: adverse events and near misses. The transportation industry performed
this comparison by testing for a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the probability of
citing each cause between train accidents resulting in injury or damage and accidents
with no damage or injury. A similar approach is used routinely in microarray diﬀerential
expression analysis (Lonnstedt & Speed 2002, Ideker and others 2000, Roberts and
others 2000), where investigators wish to compare the expression of various genes
between two samples of cells (e.g. diseased and non-diseased).
We argue that testing for diﬀerence in the probability of identifying a given cause
between adverse events and near misses is not optimal for providing evidence for
the CCH. First, a lack of evidence for signiﬁcant diﬀerences in probabilities does not
provide evidence for equality of probabilities. Second, testing for diﬀerence in the
probabilities of each cause independently does not provide an overall assessment of
the similarity between the probability of citing a cause or contributing factor in an
adverse event and the probability of citing the same cause or contributing factor in
a near miss. Evaluating the evidence for the causal continuum hypothesis requires
quantifying this similarity. Third, equality of probabilities is an unnecessarily strong
condition for assessing the validity of the CCH. Therefore, rejecting the null hypothesis
that the probabilities are equal for one or more causes does not necessarily provide
evidence against the CCH.
16
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In this analysis, we used a BHM to measure the agreement of causal proﬁles
between reports of errors that resulted in harm and reports of errors that did not
result in patient harm. Our approach assumes a more appropriate statistical deﬁnition
of the CCH based on posterior inference of a single parameter, ρ, which is estimated
accounting for varying levels of precision in the ﬁrst level parameters. Because we do
not focus on strict acceptance or rejection of the CCH, but instead aim to measure
the strength of evidence for the hypothesis, our model does not require adjustment
for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, the multiple parallel measurements of distinct
but related outcomes lends itself naturally to a hierarchical modeling approach, such
as the one we have used. Extensions of this model to include other levels of clustering,
such as clustering at the facility level, are possible as well. We found that, despite
many causes and contributing factors with unequal probabilities of being cited between
adverse events and near misses, our BHM estimated a correlation near one with very
high posterior probability. This high correlation indicates strong evidence for the CCH
in medication errors reported through the MEDMARX system.
In addition, we used a simple criterion for identifying the causes and contributing
factors with the highest and lowest log odds-ratios of being cited in adverse events
versus near misses. The causes with the highest log odds-ratios occur more frequently
in adverse events, indicating they may warrant special attention from investigators
as a priority for intervention. The two causes identiﬁed as having unusually high
log odds-ratios are both related to pumps used in the administration of medication,
where errors have little chance of being recovered before they are able to cause harm.
The causes with the lowest log odds-ratios occur more frequently in near misses,
indicating that there may be eﬀective barriers in place that prevent them from leading
to harm. These causes may be useful for the study of recovery from error and harm
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reduction. For example, computerized prescriber order entry (CPOE) was implemented
with the intention of reducing opportunities for error in medication use (Schiﬀ &
Rucker 1998). However, incorrect or incomplete entries in a CPOE system may cause
errors as well, including approximately 2% of the near misses in this study. A much
smaller proportion of adverse events were caused by CPOE (0.27%), likely due to the
error checking software built in to most COPE systems. The small log odds-ratio
observed in this study for errors caused by CPOE indicates that the CPOE systems
are actually functioning as an eﬀective barriers to stop errors from causing patient
harm once they have occurred.
One limitation of our model is that the assumption of independence between
causes implied by our model is likely to be unrealistic. The number of causes cited
simultaneously on a report ranged from 0 up to 35 out of 67 distinct possible causes
with 297,683 (35.60%) error reports citing more than one cause. Between 0 and 15
contributing factors were cited simultaneously out of 21 possible with 47,848 (5.72%)
reports citing more than one contributing factor simultaneously. Certain groups of
causes or contributing factors likely tend to be cited together when reporting an error.
Although we attempted several methods of modeling the correlation among causes,
at least on a pairwise basis, none were found to be reasonably eﬃcient due to the
extremely large size of the data. The cluster size in this application is too large
for the methods available for modeling complex correlation structures. However, the
presence of correlation among causes and contributing factors is unlikely to reverse the
conclusions reached in this analysis because modeling the correlation would primarily
inﬂuence the eﬃciency of the estimates of log-odds, not the estimates themselves.
We also note that the types, locations, and circumstances of events included in
the MEDMARX database are widely varying. Certain causes or contributing factors
18
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may be associated with many diﬀerent types of events, while others may participate in
only one type of event. Some causes may be relevant only in a portion of the reporting
facilities, for example those with on-site pharmacies, or in particular locations within
a facility, for example, a surgical unit. Considering the huge amount of variability that
is represented in the standardized report, it is not surprising that we observe such high
heterogeneity between reports within a facility, and between facilities.
Finally, the statistical methods developed in this research could be applied to the
expanding number and variety of patient safety databases and used to address other
questions of scientiﬁc importance. As these databases grow in size and complexity,
more sophisticated statistical methods are necessary to eﬃciently extract information
so that healthcare organizations may learn from their own and one another's errors
and quickly implement change to reduce patient harm.
APPENDIX: Details of model estimation
Model (1) from section 3.2 was estimated by an MCMC Gibbs sampler with a Metropolis-
Hastings step for the ﬁrst level parameters, β0 and β1. The initial values for these
parameters in both the MCMC for model (1) and the TLNise for model (3) were taken
from MLEs estimated by the models in (2). The initial values for µ0 and µ1 were the
mean of the MLEs for β0 and β1, respectively, and the initial value for Σ is the sample
covariance matrix of the MLEs.
The MCMC was run for 10,000 iterations and checked for convergence. Mixing
occurred very fast, and there was little autocorrelation even at a small lag. For ρ
in the analysis of causes, the estimated autocorrelation at lag 1 was 0.086, and in
the analysis of contributing factors, the estimated autocorrelation at lag 1 was 0.075.
Therefore, chains were not thinned, and all results reported in the body of the paper
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use the last 5000 samples from the posterior with the ﬁrst 5000 discarded as burn-in.
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Table 1: Number and percent of error reports in each harmscore category, deﬁned
by The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention
(NCC MERP). We do not include reports in category A because no error has occurred.
Near misses include reports in the categories B, C, and D. Adverse events include
reports in the categories E, F, G, H, and I.
Category Description Number Percent
No Error
A Circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause 0 0.00
error.
Error, no harm
B An error occurred but the error did not reach the patient. 371083 44.38
C An error occurred that reached the patient but did not 384553 45.99
cause patient harm.
D An error occurred that reached the patient and required 64486 7.71
monitoring to conﬁrm that it resulted in no harm to the
patient and/or required intervention to preclude harm.
Error, harm
E An error occurred that may have contributed to or 12847 1.54
resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required
intervention.
F An error occurred that may have contributed to or 2672 0.32
resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required
initial or prolonged hospitalization.
G An error occurred that may have contributed to or 139 0.02
resulted in permanent patient harm.
H An error occurred that required intervention necessary to 285 0.03
sustain life.
Error, death
I An error occurred that may have contributed to or 109 0.01
resulted in the patient's death.
Total 836174 100
23
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Table 2: List of causes that can be cited when a medication error has occurred. Deﬁnitions can be
found at www.biostat.jhsph.edu/ jamyers/research. More than one cause can be checked for each
error. For each cause, pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1 are the observed proportions of citing cause c among adverse
events and near misses, respectively. The p-value for testing H0 : p
c
0 = p
c
1 versus Ha : p
c
0 6= pc1 is
given, and a * indicates p<.05/67. rc0 and r
c
1 are the ranks of pˆ
c
0 and pˆ
c
1, respectively.
No. Cause 100×pˆc0 100×pˆc1 p-value rc0 rc1
1 Performance (human) deﬁcit 38.64 44.45 1.5× 10−50 1 1 *
2 Procedure/protocol not followed 17.12 25.69 1.0× 10−177 2 2 *
3 Transcription inaccurate/omitted 12.97 10.36 1.8× 10−22 3 5 *
4 Computer entry 11.32 7.31 5.9× 10−57 4 7 *
5 Documentation 11.30 8.88 8.8× 10−22 5 6 *
6 Communication 9.93 15.90 2.5× 10−137 6 4 *
7 Knowledge deﬁcit 9.14 16.00 1.0× 10−193 7 3 *
8 Written order 5.06 4.52 2.2× 10−03 8 11
9 System safeguard(s) 3.10 6.49 1.5× 10−129 9 9 *
10 Monitoring inadequate/lacking 2.93 7.26 2.0× 10−221 10 8 *
11 Drug distribution system 2.80 3.31 9.7× 10−05 11 13 *
12 Abbreviations 2.73 0.74 1.7× 10−53 12 31 *
13 Handwriting illegible/unclear 2.49 2.04 3.8× 10−04 13 17 *
14 Workﬂow disruption 2.41 0.54 3.5× 10−53 14 38 *
15 Dispensing device involved 2.28 3.10 7.7× 10−12 15 15 *
16 Calculation error 2.10 4.75 7.3× 10−116 16 10 *
17 Computerized prescriber order entry 2.04 0.27 2.6× 10−56 17 45 *
18 Dosage form confusion 1.93 1.89 7.4× 10−01 18 18
19 Fax/scanner involved 1.67 1.19 3.4× 10−06 19 22 *
20 Verbal order 1.63 2.39 5.1× 10−14 20 16 *
21 Contraindicated, drug allergy 1.46 3.15 1.3× 10−67 21 14 *
22 Brand/generic names look alike 1.35 0.95 1.2× 10−05 22 26 *
23 Preprinted medication order form 1.22 1.35 1.7× 10−01 23 20
24 Incorrect medication activation 1.12 1.36 4.8× 10−03 24 19
25 Brand names look alike 1.04 0.88 6.1× 10−02 25 30
26 Generic names look alike 1.00 0.67 3.7× 10−05 26 33 *
27 Labeling (your facility's) 0.98 0.92 4.4× 10−01 27 27
28 Similar packaging/labeling 0.96 1.34 1.5× 10−06 28 21 *
29 Patient identiﬁcation failure 0.94 0.51 2.5× 10−08 29 40 *
30 Computer software 0.93 1.06 1.0× 10−01 30 23
31 Brand/generic names sound alike 0.92 0.70 4.6× 10−03 31 32
32 Pump, improper use 0.90 4.16 0.0× 10+00 32 12 *
33 Brand names sound alike 0.76 0.65 1.3× 10−01 33 34
34 Packaging/container design 0.76 1.05 2.4× 10−05 34 24 *
35 Generic names sound alike 0.73 0.60 5.5× 10−02 35 36
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Table 2: (continued)
No. Cause 100×pˆc0 100×pˆc1 p-value rc0 rc1
36 Information management system 0.60 0.90 9.3× 10−07 36 29 *
37 Storage proximity 0.49 0.39 8.0× 10−02 37 44
38 Label (your facility's) design 0.46 0.56 7.1× 10−02 38 37
39 Contraindicated, drug/drug 0.45 0.45 1.0× 10+00 39 41
40 Decimal point 0.42 1.02 3.9× 10−30 40 25 *
41 Label (manufacturer's) design 0.36 0.39 4.8× 10−01 41 43
42 Non-formulary drug 0.29 0.17 4.7× 10−03 42 49
43 Reconciliation-transition 0.23 0.17 1.5× 10−01 43 50
44 MAR variance 0.22 0.16 1.2× 10−01 44 52
45 Similar products 0.22 0.07 9.3× 10−05 45 59 *
46 Diluent wrong 0.21 0.43 1.9× 10−09 46 42 *
47 Pump failure/malfunction 0.21 0.91 3.6× 10−79 47 28 *
48 Equipment design 0.20 0.62 1.5× 10−29 48 35 *
49 Leading zero missing 0.19 0.09 7.9× 10−03 49 56
50 Contraindicated in disease 0.19 0.52 2.6× 10−21 50 39 *
51 Drug shortage 0.14 0.19 1.2× 10−01 51 48
52 Preﬁx/suﬃx misinterpreted 0.11 0.17 5.0× 10−02 52 51
53 Reconciliation-admission 0.11 0.15 1.9× 10−01 53 53
54 Repackaging by your facility 0.11 0.03 4.2× 10−03 54 62
55 Blanket orders 0.09 0.07 4.0× 10−01 55 58
56 Trailing/terminal zero 0.09 0.09 9.5× 10−01 56 57
57 Reference material 0.08 0.20 9.6× 10−08 57 47 *
58 Equipment failure/malfunction 0.08 0.11 1.3× 10−01 58 55
59 Non-metric units used 0.08 0.11 2.1× 10−01 59 54
60 Measuring device 0.07 0.20 2.1× 10−08 60 46 *
61 Reconciliation-discharge 0.05 0.04 8.8× 10−01 61 60
62 Override 0.03 0.02 4.1× 10−01 62 63
63 Contraindicated, drug/food 0.02 0.03 7.6× 10−01 63 61
64 Repackaging by other facility 0.02 0.01 3.6× 10−01 64 64
65 Weight 0.01 0.01 9.2× 10−01 65 67
66 Contraindicated in pregnancy 0.01 0.01 7.0× 10−01 66 65
67 Unlabeled syringe/container 0.00 0.01 6.9× 10−01 67 66
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Table 3: List of contributing factors that can be cited when a medication error has occurred.
Deﬁnitions can be found at www.biostat.jhsph.edu/ jamyers/research. More than one contribut-
ing factor can be checked for each error. For each cause, pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1 are the observed proportions
of citing contributing factor c among adverse events and near misses, respectively. The p-value
for testing H0 : p
c
0 = p
c
1 versus Ha : p
c
0 6= pc1 is given, and a * indicates p<.05/20. rc0 and rc1 are
the ranks of pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1, respectively.
No. Contributing Factor 100×pˆc0 100×pˆc1 p-value rc0 rc1
1 Distractions 10.95 9.91 3.0× 10−05 1 1 *
2 Workload increase 6.00 4.77 6.4× 10−11 2 3 *
3 Staﬀ, inexperienced 4.19 8.07 1.3× 10−127 3 2 *
4 Staﬃng, insuﬃcient 2.32 2.26 6.6× 10−01 4 4
5 Shift change 1.38 2.25 3.9× 10−20 5 5 *
6 Cross coverage 1.25 1.40 9.7× 10−02 6 9
7 Staﬀ, agency/temporary 0.95 2.19 3.7× 10−56 7 6 *
8 Emergency situation 0.91 2.07 5.4× 10−52 8 7 *
9 No 24-hour pharmacy 0.77 0.99 2.2× 10−03 9 12 *
10 Patient transfer 0.75 1.51 2.7× 10−28 10 8 *
11 Staﬀ, ﬂoating 0.60 1.25 2.4× 10−25 11 10 *
12 No access to patient information 0.60 1.13 2.7× 10−17 12 11 *
13 Imprint, identiﬁcation failure 0.40 0.18 1.9× 10−05 13 17 *
14 Staﬃng, alternative hours 0.32 0.54 1.8× 10−06 14 13 *
15 Code situation 0.26 0.53 3.4× 10−11 15 14 *
16 Computer system/network down 0.23 0.23 9.4× 10−01 16 16
17 Patient names similar/same 0.19 0.05 8.9× 10−05 17 18 *
18 Poor lighting 0.13 0.29 9.2× 10−08 18 15 *
19 Range orders 0.05 0.04 6.3× 10−01 19 19
20 Fatigue 0.03 0.02 4.9× 10−01 20 20
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Figure 1: Number of reports submitted from each of the 100 facilities with the highest
total number of reports, plotted separately for the number of harmful reports and the
number of nonharmful reports. The facilities in each plot are sorted on total number
of reports (harmful + nonharmful).
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Figure 2: Proportion of hospitals with N > n, where N is the number of reports of
adverse events (solid line) or near misses (dashed line) submitted by a given hospital.
27
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
ll
l
l
l
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0
−
10
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
MLEs
log odds of citing a cause given no harm
lo
g 
od
ds
 o
f c
itin
g 
a 
ca
us
e 
gi
ve
n 
ha
rm
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0
−
10
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
Bayesian Posterior Means
log odds of citing a cause given no harm
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0
−
10
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
log odds of citing a contributing factor given no harm
lo
g 
od
ds
 o
f c
itin
g 
a 
co
nt
rib
ut
in
g 
fa
ct
or
 g
ive
n 
ha
rm
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0
−
10
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
log odds of citing a contributing factor given no harm
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Figure 3: Maximum likelihood estimates (left) and Bayesian estimates (right) of the
log-odds of citing a cause (or contributing factor) given that harm has occurred ver-
sus harm has not occurred with plotting symbols inversely scaled according to the
maximum of the two associated variances (one for each log-odds estimate). Causes
identiﬁed as having the highest or lowest log odds-ratio of being cited in adverse
events versus near misses by the BHM are plotted with a solid circle. The top panel
shows the results for the 67 causes, and the bottom panel shows the results for the
20 contributing factors.
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Figure 4: Posterior distribution of the correlation between the log odds of citing a
cause given that harm has occurred and the log odds of citing the same cause given
that harm has not occurred for causes (left) and contributing factors (right).
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Figure 5: Boxplots of posterior distributions of the standardized log-odds diﬀerence θc,
as estimated by the BHM for causes (top) and contributing factors (bottom). Dashed
lines mark the chosen cutoﬀ for identifying aberrant causes, t = 1.96
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Captions
Table 1: Number and percent of error reports in each harmscore category, deﬁned
by The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention
(NCC MERP). We do not include reports in category A because no error has occurred.
Near misses include reports in the categories B, C, and D. Adverse events include re-
ports in the categories E, F, G, H, and I.
Table 2: List of causes that can be cited when a medication error has occurred. Deﬁni-
tions can be found at www.biostat.jhsph.edu/ jamyers/research. More than one cause
can be checked for each error. For each cause, pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1 are the observed proportions
of citing cause c among adverse events and near misses, respectively. The p-value for
testing H0 : p
c
0 = p
c
1 versus Ha : p
c
0 6= pc1 is given, and a * indicates p<.05/67. rc0
and rc1 are the ranks of p
c
0 and p
c
1, respectively.
Table 3: List of contributing factors that can be cited when a medication error has oc-
curred. Deﬁnitions can be found at www.biostat.jhsph.edu/ jamyers/research. More
than one contributing factor can be checked for each error. For each contributing
factor, pˆc0 and pˆ
c
1 are the observed proportions of citing contributing factor c among
adverse events and near misses, respectively. The p-value for testing H0 : p
c
0 = p
c
1
versus Ha : p
c
0 6= pc1 is given, and a * indicates p<.05/67. rc0 and rc1 are the ranks of
pc0 and p
c
1, respectively.
Figure 1: Number of reports submitted from each of the 100 facilities with the highest
total number of reports, plotted separately for the number of harmful reports and the
number of nonharmful reports. The facilities in each plot are sorted on total number
of reports (harmful + nonharmful).
Figure 2: Proportion of hospitals with N > n, where N is the number of reports of
adverse events (solid line) or near misses (dashed line) submitted by a given hospital.
Figure 3: Maximum likelihood estimates (left) and Bayesian estimates (right) of the
log- odds of citing a cause (or contributing factor) given that harm has occurred ver-
sus harm has not occurred with plotting symbols inversely scaled according to the
maximum of the two associated variances (one for each log-odds estimate). Causes
identiﬁed as having the highest or lowest log odds-ratio of being cited in adverse
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events versus near misses by the BHM are plotted with a solid circle. The top panel
shows the results for the 67 causes, and the bottom panel shows the results for the
20 contributing factors.
Figure 4: Posterior distribution of the correlation between the log odds of citing a
cause given that harm has occurred and the log odds of citing the same cause given
that harm has not occurred for causes (left) and contributing factors (right).
Figure 5: Boxplots of posterior distributions of the standardized log-odds diﬀerence θc,
as estimated by the BHM for causes (top) and contributing factors (bottom). Dashed
lines mark the chosen cutoﬀ for identifying aberrant causes, t = 1 : 96.
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